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Significant change is occurring in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Dramatic change has already occurred on the operational side as the AAF has significantly ex-panded and modernized in the past seven years. The air force added C-208s, 
C-130s, and MD-530s to the fleet, and in 2016 the first four A-29s arrived.1 These 
platforms provide the AAF with airlift, search and rescue, and attack capability as 
coalition forces have transitioned to a train, advise, and assist role and relegated 
combat operations to Afghan forces. Change is also on the horizon for support func-
tions of the AAF. Specifically, a transition of financial responsibility from US to Afghan 
processes is underway. The current AAF construct, however, is ill-suited to facilitate 
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this transition. No mechanism exists to effectively transition aviation unique require-
ments from coalition to Afghan control under the extant financial construct. Addition-
ally, the lack of authorities in the resource allocation process is a significant problem for 
the AAF as it resides under the Afghanistan National Army (ANA). Thus, this article ex-
amines the current resource allocation problems the AAF is experiencing and subse-
quently provides a road map to ameliorate these issues through organizational change.
We analyze the AAF through extensive interviews of coalition advisors and Head-
quarters (HQ) AAF personnel. In conjunction with the information acquired from 
these interviews, we utilize the accumulated knowledge gained from one year of 
field work training, advising, and assisting at HQ AAF. The research is scoped to the 
AAF’s financial and procurement processes and encompasses a thorough examina-
tion of the ongoing resource allocation problems they face today. Additionally, we 
analyze how widespread corruption in Afghanistan is adversely impacting the re-
source allocation process.2 Thus, this article seeks to determine solutions to the re-
source allocation problems the AAF is currently experiencing.
Afghanistan National Army Force Structure
There are several components that encompass the force structure for the ANA. 
The Ministry of Defense (MoD) is one of 24 ministries in the Afghan government.3 
The MoD, along with the general staff, are responsible for those functions neces-
sary to ensure operational readiness for the ANA.4 ANA combat forces are divided 
into six geographically numbered corps (201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 209th, and 
215th) plus a capital region division in Kabul. (see Figure 1)5 This corps construct 
resulted from the reestablishment of the ANA after the fall of the Taliban in 2002 
and stabilized to its current six corps plus capital region form in 2009. Each of the 
six regional corps manages one to four brigades which are comprised of multiple 
battalions (called kandaks in Afghanistan). As of March 2016, the ANA had 203,000 
people with approximately 7,400 of those personnel designated as AAF.6 
207th 
Corps
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Corps
201 st
Corps
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203rd 
Corps
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Figure 1. Afghan Army Corps (reproduced from GAO)7
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The Afghan Air Force resides within the ANA and not as a separate component. 
The AAF is comprised of three wings (Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand), an AAF 
headquarters, and an Air Academy (Pohantoon-e-Hawayee, dubbed PeH). In total, 
there are 34 units attached to the three AAF wings. It is important to understand 
that these units are geographically dispersed throughout the country and reside 
within the ANA corps construct. As a result, control resides with the corps. The 
ANA corps manage the AAF units that fall within their purview like a typical army 
unit (i.e. like an infantry brigade). This ANA–AAF relationship and its implications 
for allocating resources will be explored in subsequent sections.
The Ministry of Defense Budget Landscape
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. As a war-torn country 
with a literacy rate of only 31 percent,8 Afghanistan has struggled to generate a sus-
tainable economy. In 2015, Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
was $672 US dollars (USD), compared to that of the US GDP per capita of $56,596 
USD and the world GDP per capital of $15,800 USD. Using this metric, Afghanistan 
ranks as the 16th poorest country in the world.9 Afghanistan levies a progressive 
income tax system, with the top tax bracket at 20 percent.10 However, the genera-
tion of revenue remains low. Corruption in income and sales tax collection remains 
problematic as the collection system lacks the necessary checks and balances. Af-
ghanistan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) states that “systematic corruption of tax of-
ficials is a serious threat to future tax collection.”11 As a result, much of Afghani-
stan’s revenue comes from international donor nations.
The MoD budget mirrors the economic reality in Afghanistan. The majority of 
the funding supporting the MoD is a result of donor nations. Seventy–three percent 
of MoD funding (as shown in Figure 2) comes from the United States. Almost 10 
percent is provided by other donor nations through the NATO Trust Fund, with 8.6 
percent coming from the United Nations Development Program. The Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) only directly contributes 8.6 percent 
of the total MoD budget.
2,024.5, 42.8%
406.6, 8.6%
405.2, 8.6%
455.7, 9.6%
1,424.1, 30.3%
GIRoA
NATO TF
United Nations
U.S. - ON Budget
U.S. - OFF Budget
Figure 2. MoD fiscal year 2017 budget commitments 
Summer 2017 | 7
Improving Resource Management in the Afghan Air Force 
The execution of US-funded MoD requirements are designated as either “on-budget” 
or “off-budget” (see also Figure 2). The designation as on- or off-budget denotes 
which acquisition processes will be employed to procure the end item. Off-budget 
requirements are contracted and managed through US processes. For example, the 
purchase of an aircraft platform (e.g. A-29) for the AAF is completed as a pseudo-
foreign military sale. The contracting and management of that purchase is com-
pleted through the A-29 Systems Program Office at Wright–Patterson AFB, Ohio. 
While the end item (the A-29) is delivered and signed over to the Afghans, the pro-
cesses that resulted in that delivery are completely outside of Afghan channels. 
Currently, aircraft platforms, contracted logistics support maintenance, and pilot 
training are all off-budget AAF requirements.
On-budget funds are executed through the Afghan MoD acquisition processes. 
Requirements are vetted through a requirements acquisition board and upon ap-
proval are executed by the internal Afghan procurement process. Coalition members 
are available to advise on these processes, but they do not have a direct role in the 
execution of funds. Typical on-budget requirements are for base and life support: 
ground fuel, electricity, water, food, firewood, and clothing. Therefore, the impor-
tant distinction between on- and off-budget is not the source of the funds, but rather 
the execution of the funds.
The designation of an item as on- or off-budget is becoming increasingly important. 
US forces in Afghanistan continue to draw down from a peak of more than 100,000 
troops in 2010 to a projected force of 5,500 by 2017.12 As a result, more items transition 
each year from off- to on-budget. These coalition forces are focused on actively train-
ing, advising, and assisting on Afghan financial and procurement processes with the 
goal to eventually transition all requirements to the Afghan on-budget process.
Current Ministry of Defense Budget Process
To understand the problems the AAF is encountering in the resource allocation 
process, it is first imperative to possess foundational knowledge of the current MoD 
budget process. All 24 ministries in the Afghanistan government are designated as 
primary budgetary units (PBU).13 A PBU is a legal entity of the state with appropria-
tion provided to it under an act of the National Assembly. Afghan law determines 
the specific budget amounts appropriated for each PBU. The MoD, as one of the 24 
ministries, is a PBU with a specified budget. Thus, fund authority flows from the 
MoF to the MoD (See Figure 3).
The Ministry of Defense–Finance (MoD–F) is the financial arm of the MoD. It is 
analogous to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller in the United 
States. The MoD–F accounts for and monitors the funds the MoD receives. There 
are 13 budget builders, including the MoD–F, in the MoD as shown in Figure 3. Bud-
get builders collect requirements, build spend plans, and request funds through the 
Afghan budget generation process. Once a budget is approved, the budget builder 
receives the allotment of funds for their areas of responsibility. There are two types 
of budget builders. The budget builders are either general staff budget builders or 
MoD organizational budget builders. The primary difference between the two types 
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of budget builders is whether they serve in a numbered staff function (general staff) 
or a specified organizational function (MoD organization). The general staff budget 
builders are aligned similarly to the US numbered structure that is rooted in the 
nineteenth–century French army continental staff system. For example, the Gen-
eral Staff Chief of Communications (GSG6) is the budget builder for communica-
tions like J6 is communications in the Department of Defense. The GSG6 budget 
builder is responsible for all communication unique requirements. Similarly, items 
that are common to all units (e.g. office supplies) flow through the logistics budget 
builder—the GSG4. In addition to the general staff budget builders, there are MoD 
organization budget builders. For example, acquisition, technology, and logistics is a 
MoD organizational budget builder.
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Ministry of Defense Finance (MoD-F)
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Eng
Kabul Wing Kandahar Wing Shindand Wing
GSG2 GSG4
20
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20
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Primary Budget Unit
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Within each
Secondary Budget Unit
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Figure 3. Current Ministry of Defense process
The PBU has the authority to provide suballotments of funds to secondary budget 
unit (SBUs) for management.14 Thus, SBUs consist of offices of PBUs that have been 
delegated responsibility for financial management. When this occurs, the SBU be-
comes the crucial unit of control. All of the corps from Figure 1 are SBUs. 
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Significant authorities are conferred by SBU designation. Specifically, the SBU is 
the entity that has ownership and authorities over all the subordinate units’ require-
ments. For example, the 205th Corps (in the Kandahar area of Afghanistan as shown 
in Figure 1) has ownership of four brigades and their subordinate units. This includes 
the AAF Kandahar wing and all other AAF units located in the geographic area of 
the corps. As an SBU, the 205th Corps receives individual budget suballotments from 
the 13 budget builders and controls the dissemination of that suballotment to the 
brigades and wing underneath it. Designation as an SBU results in other authorities 
that are not strictly financial. For example, an SBU has procurement authority. It can 
approve contracts under various threshold limits.15 When these items are procured, 
they are stored in facilities called depots. Depots in Afghanistan contain anything 
from paper and pens to spare parts. Gaining access to the items in the depots re-
quires signatory authority.16 This signatory authority resides at the SBU level. There-
fore, a SBU not only has financial and procurement authority but also possesses 
control of the dissemination of procured items through the depot system. Thus, the 
authorities that come from SBU designation result in great power. 
Current Resource Allocation Problems for AAF
The current construct is causing multiple problems in the resource allocation 
process for the AAF. First, there is no financial focal point at the MoD-level that can 
provide a holistic aviation picture. None of the 13 current budget builders (see Fig-
ure 3) are designed to support aviation unique requirements. Rather, they are de-
signed for support functions (e.g. GSG2, GSG7, etc.) and other organizational needs 
(MoD organizations) but not aviation unique requirements. This is not to say the 
structure as a whole is broken. The current construct is effectively designed to ac-
count for those items that are crosscutting across brigades or wings. For example, 
computers are common to all units in the MoD whether they are part of the army 
(ANA) or air force (AAF). The current GSG6 budget builder is populated with com-
munication professionals and can effectively build budgets for those requirements. 
However, when it comes to aviation unique requirements (i.e. aviation fuel, aircraft 
platform procurement, aircraft contractor logistics support, etc.), there is no current 
mechanism in place. This has not been a problem in the past because the nascent 
air force was being built, and the overwhelming majority of aviation unique items 
were off-budget and therefore budgeted and procured through US processes. As of 
2016, the only on-budget aviation unique items are aviation fuel and some unique 
aviation training. These two items are currently budgeted through the GSG4 for avi-
ation fuel and the GSG7 for aviation training.
Understanding the current issues with the on-budget aviation fuel requirement is 
illustrative of the greater problem. The GSG4, as the budget builder for aviation 
fuel, has the responsibility to build the requirement, develop the spending plan, 
and has a critical role in supporting the payment process upon contract award. The 
GSG4, however, is responsible for ground fuel in addition to aviation fuel (among 
many other items). As a result, in the financial system, the GSG4 combines the 
budget dollars for aviation and ground fuel.17 Historically, there have been shortages 
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in ground fuel that resulted in a myriad of problems such as electricity loss for 
weeks on end at various military installations.18 The reasons for fuel shortages often 
lead back to corruption.19 Fuel is diverted and sold on the black market. Unauthor-
ized vehicles are filled with fuel, and even those vehicles that are authorized are 
used inappropriately for personal reasons.20 This is not a problem that would be 
solved through additional budgetary dollars as the current allocation is theoretically 
sufficient if utilized and accounted for properly. Due to the shortages, it is better for 
the GSG4 to keep all fuel (ground, aviation, etc.) aggregated in the accounting sys-
tem to keep the problem opaque and preserve internal priorities. Recall that the 
GSG4 is comprised of ANA professionals, and the six corps are under ANA com-
mand. The GSG4, therefore, receives constant pressure from its ANA brethren in 
the six corps to meet ground fuel needs. The tendency is to prioritize ground fuel 
needs over aviation needs. Ground fuel shortages are therefore addressed at the ex-
pense of aviation fuel needs. Despite pressure from coalition advisors, the GSG4 
has been unwilling to separate the accounting for aviation fuel from the accounting 
for ground fuel. Why? The simple answer is the transparency this type of account-
ability would provide is anathema to their objective.
The current accountability and transparency problems experienced by aviation 
fuel are likely to be exasperated in the future. The extensive expansion of aviation 
platforms (e.g. A-29, MD-530, C-208, etc.) in the past two years and plans for the in-
duction of more aviation assets constitute a major turning point in fleet size and re-
quire a shift in the management of resources. These items and the associated avia-
tion unique requirements that come with them (e.g. aircraft maintenance, spare 
parts, pilot training, etc.) cannot be moved from off-budget to on-budget with effec-
tive accountability under the current system.
The second major resource allocation problem for the AAF revolves around au-
thorities. The AAF does not have ownership over its requirements. As previously 
discussed, authorities over requirements reside at the SBU level. As shown in Fig-
ure 3, the six corps are the only entities designated as SBUs in the MoD. AAF’s lack 
of authority over requirements results in a lack of visibility, transparency, and ac-
countability. It is imperative to understand that the suballotment of funds authority 
resides at the SBU level and is coded as such in the accounting system. The Afghan 
accounting system does not break out brigade and wing level units in their chart of 
accounts.21 As a result, the AAF often ends up receiving not only less than their full 
requirement but is often a less-than-proportional quantity than the pure army units 
within the SBU. Because there is no transparency and visibility below the SBU 
level—indicating the intention for the suballotted funds—the AAF has no recourse 
to claim they did not receive their fair share.
The lack of authority negatively affects the AAF in other areas. All items (e.g. 
printer cartridges, spare parts, etc.) procured for the ANA end up in depots. The 
AAF lacks the authority to withdraw these items from the depots and track or manage 
their allotment of resources. It is another area where corruption is problematic. 
The lack of authority also affects allotment training and travel requirements. The 
AAF does not have the authority to approve orders but instead must request travel to 
attend training from its parent organizations. Placing this authority outside the AAF 
not only results in time delays but also the potential for disapproval by nonaviation 
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professionals who do not fully understand the importance of the travel and train-
ing. This affects the human capital in the AAF. Lastly, the lack of authority results 
in duplicative processes for reporting. AAF units report through their wings to both 
the AAF HQ and the parent corps in which they reside. This duplicative reporting 
wastes resources.
In summary, the resource allocation problems the AAF is experiencing today 
come down to three issues. First, there is not a MoD-level entity that functions to 
serve aviation equities in the resource allocation process. Second, the AAF does not 
have ownership or authority over their requirements because this authority resides 
at the corps (SBU) level. And third, the current resource allocation construct exas-
perates the widespread corruption problems in the MOD.
Solution: A New Construct for the AAF
This research finds that there are two primary changes that can alleviate the 
problems the AAF is experiencing in the resource allocation process. First, a change 
is needed at the MoD level to account for all unique aviation requirements. This 
can be accomplished through the establishment of an aviation budget builder (ABB) 
as a new entity. This MoD level ABB would add to the 13 current budget builders as 
a new, 14th budget builder. The ABB would serve as the financial focal point at the 
MoD level, providing a holistic aviation picture to leadership. Reporting would be 
more efficient and streamlined. Additionally, as more and more aviation unique 
items transition from off- to on-budget, the criticality of an ABB increases. The cur-
rent MoD financial construct is not designed to handle this transition. The ABB fills 
the impending gap in the process.
 Corruption must also be considered. Visibility, transparency, and accountability 
would be greatly enhanced with an ABB as allotments of funds would have aviation 
coded designators. The result is a reduction in corruption as transparency in-
creases. This transparency would flow over to the corps also, as aviation items such 
as aviation fuel would no longer be bundled with other ground fuels. Thus, in-
creased transparency and accountability of ground fuel transactions would be a pos-
itive second order effect of this change.
The second change suggested by this research is to designate the AAF as an 
SBU. This change necessarily entails breaking the AAF out from under the corps 
from a financial standpoint. The authorities conferred to the AAF as an SBU would 
result in air force control over their requirements. Coupled with the ABB, the AAF 
would have complete visibility, transparency, and accountability in the resource 
allocation process. Additionally, three other authority issues previously discussed 
would be solved. First, the AAF as an SBU would have the ability to place and re-
move items from the depots. This would result in better accountability and less 
corruption. Second, human capital would be enhanced as training would be con-
trolled by the AAF. The AAF would generate orders and have full control over the 
timing and placement of individuals into training programs. Lastly, reporting 
would be streamlined. The duplicative reports that go through both the corps and 
HQ AAF would cease to exist. Reporting would only be necessary through the AAF 
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channels. Figure 4 shows the new construct with both the ABB and AAF as an SBU 
construct implemented together.
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Figure 4. New construct with ABB and AAF with SBU authorities
As shown in Figure 4, the requirements from the wings no longer flow through 
the corps as previously shown in Figure 3. Instead, all requirements in Budget Cir-
cular No. 122 flow from the wings directly to the AAF HQ as the SBU. This results in 
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a single line of reporting. Once requirements are consolidated at the AAF SBU, the 
unique aviation requirements flow up to the newly established aviation budget 
builder. It is important to recall that only the aviation unique requirements flow 
through the ABB. All nonaviation unique requirements would flow from the wings 
to the AAF SBU but then flow to their currently established budget builder. For ex-
ample, while aviation fuel (an aviation unique requirement) would flow from the 
AAF SBU to the ABB, computers (a nonaviation unique requirement) would flow 
from the AAF SBU directly to the GSG6 budget builder. The remainder of the re-
quirements generation process remains unchanged with requirements flowing from 
the budget builders to the MoD–F and MoF. Budget authority then flows back down 
through the Budget Circular No. 2 process. However, the allotment of funds now 
flows down through the ABB to the AAF as an SBU. Accountability and transpar-
ency for AAF requirements are achieved. The AAF SBU and ABB are therefore com-
plementary entities in the MoD resource allocation process. Together they provide 
a holistic, seamless approach to AAF requirement generation and budget execution.
Discussion
 Timing is important when implementing change. That window of opportunity is 
open. AAF personnel and processes are currently postured to successfully transi-
tion to a fully functioning SBU. Despite lacking SBU authorities, coalition personnel 
have been actively training AAF personnel on the processes necessary to succeed. 
For example, in 2016 the AAF developed their own requirements (more than 22,000 
line items) for the first time.23 As a result, AAF personnel were invited to participate 
in the MoD-level program working groups that are responsible for developing Budget 
Circular No. 1. AAF participation in the Budget Circular No. 1 process demonstrated 
the capacity to function as an SBU, despite lacking the authority to be an SBU. Partici-
pation in the process without authority is valuable to develop and demonstrate com-
petency, however, without authority it is an exercise in futility. Accountability and 
transparency cannot be improved without the necessary authorities in the resource 
allocation process.
Manning and organizational change are also necessary to implement the change 
to SBU authority for the AAF. These changes are already in motion. The AAF has 
postured itself during the past two years with incremental changes to the Tashkil to 
organizationally align personnel to operate as an SBU. (The Tashkil is the official 
list of required ANA and AAF personnel by position and rank.) Thus, the AAF has 
the manpower capacity to operate as an SBU if given the authority.
Similarly, the time is right for the establishment of a MoD-level ABB. The aviation 
portfolio is rapidly expanding with more aircraft platforms and larger quantities of 
existing platforms being added to the existing portfolio. These platforms and their 
associated training and maintenance are all currently resourced off-budget. The 
transition of these items from off- to on-budget is the ultimate coalition goal. But to 
effectively transition, a mechanism needs to be in place that allows for visibility, ac-
countability, and transparency. The establishment of an ABB meets that need. Making 
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the change now sets the AAF up for success as the air portfolio expands and enables 
a phased transition of items from off- to on-budget in future years.
Official approval of an ABB and the AAF as an SBU through MoD channels may 
be the easier task. Implementation will be difficult. The coalition advisor role compli-
cates this process. Because donor nations provide the overwhelming majority of 
funds, the coalition advisors have significant influence over the MoD. These coalition 
advisors, however, have continual turnover with tours in Afghanistan that typically 
range from six months to one year. The momentum an advisor group builds toward 
achieving an initiative is often slowed or stopped by the inevitable personnel turnover.
Additionally, Afghan culture is an impediment to implementation. Culturally, 
Afghans do not typically say “no.” Rather, they will concur with a proposal, but they 
do not necessarily implement it. Previous research demonstrates that culture 
shapes human behavior and indicates cultural changes are slow to occur. Research 
by Douglas C. North found that informal constraints (norms of behavior, self-imposed 
codes of conduct, etc.) comprise the institutions that “are the humanly devised con-
straints that structure human interaction.”24 While Oliver E. Williamson finds that 
customs, traditions, and norms take 100–1,000 years to change.25 Thus, it would not 
be surprising if the ABB and SBU were agreed upon in principle and codified as policy 
but simply ignored. To be clear, we are not suggesting it would be ignored by indi-
viduals in the AAF. Our interviews indicate that the AAF recognizes the problems 
and are advocates for the solution presented here. Rather, it is the reality that the 
AAF resides within the ANA that may be problematic. While ANA members have 
not explicitly stated they are opposed to these changes, they also have not been ac-
tively pursuing change. Thus, coupling cultural inertia with the coalition advisor 
turnover problem is a potential risk to the successful implementation of the ABB 
and SBU initiatives. We are, however, cautiously optimistic that these obstacles can 
be overcome. The benefits of ABB and SBU authorities are too significant to default 
to the status quo. The structural changes in Afghan financial and procurement pro-
cesses indicated herein can alleviate the resource problems the AAF is experienc-
ing and at the same time help to reduce corruption in the MOD. 
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